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Previewsdopamine function, impairs signal propa-
gation through corticostriatal circuits,
and leads to excess bursting in a thala-
morecipient motor cortical area, resulting
in abnormal vocal variability. Extending
this model to mammals and humans re-
quires a better understanding of how vari-
ability—the ‘‘trial’’ part of trial-and-error
learning—might be actively generated by
the mammalian brain.
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Dissociating the source and function of value-related signals is a major challenge for understanding the
role of reward in neural processing. In this issue of Neuron, Rudebeck et al. (2013) provide insight into the
neuroanatomical origins of a subset of these signals.Neurons throughout the brain are
affected by an encounter with a valuable
item. Some neurons are activated while
others are suppressed. Some have brief,
phasic responses, while others exhibit
more prolonged changes. It is likely that
different value-related signals play dis-
tinct roles in neural processing, contrib-
uting, for example, to affect, perception,
motivation or learning. Some putative
value signals are better explained by
the degree to which a stimulus is
salient (Leathers and Olson, 2012) or sur-
prising (Hayden et al., 2011; Kennerley
et al., 2011). But because these functions
can all correlate with reward value,
dissociating them is a major challenge
in understanding the neural substratesof motivated behavior (Wallis and Rich,
2011).
Despite the prevalence of reward sig-
nals in the brain, the ability to use reward
information to guide future behavior
depends primarily on a subset of brain
regions, among them the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), medial frontal cortex
(MFC), and amygdala. Damage to these
structures causes impairments in value-
based learning or choice, whereas dam-
age to other structures does not. How-
ever, the precise contribution of each of
these areas remains unclear, and rela-
tively few studies have been able to
demonstrate functional dissociations.
In a new study, Rudebeck et al. (2013)
provide insight into one aspect that distin-guishes some of these reward signals in
the frontal cortex. In order to functionally
dissociate value signals, the traditional
approach uses behavioral manipulations
to tease apart cognitive or emotional vari-
ables. In contrast, Rudebeck et al. (2013)
employed the unique approach of
combining neuron recording with selec-
tive neurotoxic lesions to identify value
signals that depend on particular neuro-
anatomical circuits. Given their role in
value-based behavior, this study focused
on three brain regions, OFC, a region of
MFC that lies within the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex, and the amygdala. All
three of these regions encode value sig-
nals and are anatomically interconnected
in a bidirectional manner (Ghashghaei
Neuron
Previewset al., 2007). However, the nature of the
information exchanged between them
and its contribution to decision making
remain unclear.
To elucidate these processes, Rude-
beck et al. (2013) trained monkeys to
associate picture cues with different
amounts of fluid reward. The most valu-
able pictures predicted the largest
amounts of fluid, and the least valuable
the smallest. On each trial, subjects
were given a choice between two picture
cues that appeared sequentially. After
their choice and a short delay, they
received the outcome associated with
the chosen picture. Monkeys learned
this task well and, as predicted, neurons
in the OFC and MFC encoded the values
of both pictures. There were more neu-
rons encoding value in OFC compared
to MFC, and value selectivity appeared
at shorter latencies in OFC. After charac-
terizing neural encoding in this task in
intact animals, the subjects were given
bilateral amygdala lesions. Rudebeck
et al. (2013) confirmed that the lesions
had a behavioral effect by showing that
subjects were modestly impaired at
learning new stimulus-outcome associa-
tions. Importantly, though, they were not
impaired in the task with familiar stimuli,
and it was in this task that neural encoding
of value was reassessed after lesion. Be-
ing able to compare neural coding during
identical behaviors was critical. If perfor-
mance was impaired by amygdala lesion,
it would be impossible to determine
whether changes in behavior were due
to changes in neural coding or vice versa.
After amygdala lesion, neurons in the
same regions of OFC and MFC were
again assessed for value encoding.
Value signals were still present in both
areas, but OFC signals were significantly
reduced by amygdalectomy, while MFC
signals were not. The proportion of OFC
neurons encoding value both at the time
of the picture cues and at the time of
reward delivery declined to match the
proportions found in MFC. In addition,
there was a significant decline in the dif-
ference between OFC and MFC in the la-
tency to encode value information. These
findings have two implications. First, they
indicate that OFC and the amygdala form
a functional unit important for guiding
behavior based on predictive cues. In
contrast, it appears that this cohesiverelationship does not exist between the
amygdala and MFC. Indeed, the lack of
significant changes in MFC suggests not
only that amygdala neurons are not a sig-
nificant source of value information for
MFC directly, but also that the OFC value
signals derived from amygdala inputs do
not contribute substantially to the infor-
mation that is fed from OFC to MFC
through their mutual connectivity. If
OFC shared amygdala-dependent value
information with MFC, one would have
observed a change in MFC value coding
as an indirect result of amygdala lesion,
but this was not the case. Second, the re-
sults suggest that both OFC and MFC
receive a source of value information
that is independent of the amygdala.
Dopaminergic neurons are one possible
source of this signal. Alternatively, the
signal might reflect value computations
local to OFC and MFC.
Having demonstrated the existence of
amygdala-dependent and amygdala-in-
dependent value signals in frontal neu-
rons, a key question for future research
is the functional significance of these sig-
nals. On the one hand, amygdala inputs
could simply add quantitatively to OFC
coding, so that more OFC neurons
encode the same value signals. More
likely, however, amygdala inputs may
carry information that is qualitatively
different from other OFC value signals.
Traditional interpretations have attrib-
uted the same role of forming and updat-
ing stimulus-reward associations to both
OFC and amygdala, but more recent
investigations have found subtle dis-
tinctions. For example, Salzman and col-
leagues have shown that, during learning,
amygdala is the source of negative value
signals (punishment) for OFC, while OFC
serves as the source of positive value sig-
nals (reward) for the amygdala (Morrison
et al., 2011). In rodents, lesions of the ba-
solateral nucleus of the amygdala caused
OFC signals to be more bound to cue
identity, rather than cue-associated out-
comes (Schoenbaum et al., 2003), sug-
gesting that amygdala inputs supplied
outcome-related information. This ap-
pears inconsistent with the current result
that OFC value signals persist following
amygdala lesion, but it is difficult to
directly compare results across species
since the homology between primate
and rat OFC is unclear, and there areNeuron 80, Dealso differences between the two species
in the kinds of neuronal response that are
typically observed in OFC (Wallis, 2012).
Whereas rodent studies observe encod-
ing of cue-outcome associations, most
primate studies, like the current one,
observe coding of expected value,
defined as a graded response to pictures
that are physically different but associ-
ated with graded amounts of reward.
Future experiments could also study
how loss of OFC input affects value cod-
ing in the amygdala. Given that OFC-
amygdala connectivity is bidirectional, it
would be equally interesting to know
what information is exchanged in the
opposite direction. On one hand, OFC is
often viewed as sitting near the apex of
increasingly abstract sensory representa-
tions, combiningmultiple sources of infor-
mation to form an overall estimate of value
or utility. Consistent with this view, it re-
ceives inputs from all sensory modalities
as well as many subcortical and limbic
structures, including the amygdala. How-
ever, the pattern of laminar connections
within OFC implies that the feedforward
flow of information is from anterior to
posterior areas, similar to other prefrontal
areas (Barbas and Rempel-Clower, 1997),
suggesting that the role of OFC is more
‘‘top-down’’ in nature. This suggests that
OFC could exert significant influence
over amygdala coding. Indeed, in rats,
OFC inputs allow amygdala neurons to
rapidly encode outcome predictions un-
der changing circumstances, even before
animals adjust their behavioral choices
(Saddoris et al., 2005). OFC lesion dimin-
ishes these rapidly formed prediction
signals. Furthermore, in monkeys re-
sponding to well-learned affective cues,
OFC activity reliably preceded amygdala
activity, irrespective of whether the cue
was associated with a positive or negative
outcome (Morrison et al., 2011).
In summary, the results of Rudebeck
et al. (2013) demonstrate important
neuroanatomical distinctions among
the multiple representations of value in
the primate frontal cortex and provide
compelling evidence for a tighter coupl-
ing between the amygdala and OFC
compared toMFC. Contrasting the unique
roles of OFC and amygdala within their
highly interconnected circuit could help
us to better understand their respective
contributions to value-guided choice.cember 18, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 1345
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